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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK M. SLOAN.
Plaintiff (Petitioner)
Case No.

vs.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, ROTO
ROOTER SERVICES and S & S ROOTER
and/or WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF
UTAH and EMPLOYERS' REINSURANCE FUND,

900037-CA

Classification #6

Defendants (Respondents).
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT EMPLOYERS' REINSURANCE FUND

I.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this

Appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Sections 35-1-86 (1988) and
78-2a-3(2) (a)
Industrial
increase

(1989).

This

Commission
in

appeal

of Utah

permanent

partial

is

denying

from

an

Order

of

Plaintiff's

claim

for an

impairment

and

temporary

the

total

benefits.
Plaintiff
with

the

permanent

filed

four

Industrial

Commission

partial

impairment

separate
of

Utah

Applications
seeking

compensation,

an

for

Hearing

increase

temporary

in

total

compensation and continued medical coverage as allowed pursuant to
the Utah Workers' Compensation Act, Utah Code Annotated, Section
35-1-1 et seq (R. 32-37).
Pursuant to Section 35-1-24 Utah Code Annotated, an

evidentiary hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge on
September

22. 1988.

At the time of hearing, Plaintiff offered into

evidence two medical reports from Dr. Robert H. Lamb one dated March
25.

1988 and

binder

of

one dated

medical

September

records

19. 1988.

divided

into

four

Defendants
categories

offered a
basically

relating to the four different industrial accidents; I - 1985, II 1984. Ill - 1983. and

IV - 1981.

The medical evidence offered by

the Defendants included records from;
I - 1985
LANE F. SMITH, M.D.
WESTERN NEUROLOGICAL ASSOCIATES
ROBERT H. LAMB, M.D.
SPINAL CLINIC PHYSICAL THERAPY
ST. MARK'S HOSPITAL
II - 1984
W.E. HESS, M.D.
THOMAS D. NOONAN. M.D.
ROBERT H. LAMB, M.D.
ST. MARK'S HOSPITAL
III - 1983
ROBERT H. LAMB, M.D.
FRANK DITURI, M.D.
WESTERN NEUROLOGICAL ASSOCIATES
ST. MARK'S HOSPITAL
IV - 1981
ROBERT S. HOOD, M.D.
NATHIEL M. NORD, M.D.
BOYD G. HOLBROOK, M.D.
ROBERT H. LAMB. M.D.
WESTERN NEUROLOGICAL ASSOCIATES
MARLIN W. DAHL. M.D.
THOMAS D. NOONAN. M.D.
ST. MARK'S HOSPITAL
There were no objections to the medical evidence offered
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by Plaintiff or Defendants and the Administrative Law Judge admitted
them

into

evidence.

The only witness

called

to testify at the

hearing was the Plaintiff (R. 59, 118-265).
At

the

Administrative
case

to

conclusion

of

the

Law Judge referred

a medical

Section 35-1-77.

panel

as

evidentiary

certain medical

allowed

under

hearing,

the

aspects of the

Utah Code Annotated,

The medical panel was to assign a percentage of

permanent partial impairment to the Plaintiff's pre-existing lumbar
condition.
the

In addition, the medical panel was asked to apportion

additional

percentage

of

permanent

partial

impairment

attributable to each of the four industrial injuries as compared to
the pre-existing condition (R. 269-270).
The Medical Panel issued its report on November 28, 1988,
after a thorough examination of Plaintiff and a complete review of
all

the

medical

pre-existing
person.
permanent

(pre

records.
1981)

The

Medical

lumbar

condition

The Medical Panel further

found

Panel
at

rated
five

Plaintiffs

percent

no rateable

whole

percent of

impairment for the lumbar condition attributable to each

of the four

industrial

accidents

(R. 271-283).

On December 28,

1988, Plaintiff filed written objections to the Medical Panel but
did not request a hearing on his objections (R. 284-289).

No new

medical evidence was proffered (R. 290).
On January 11, 1989, the Administrative Law Judge issued
his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order which analyzed
the evidence and adopted the Medical Panel's findings as his own (R.
290-295).
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On February 9. 1989, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Review
with the Industrial Commission of Utah.

Said Motion for Review was

denied by the Industrial Commission on June 1, 1989 (R. 301-302).
Plaintiff

then filed

Appeals on July 6, 1989.
Appeals

issued

Commission

dated

its

the Utah Court of

On October 2, 1989, the Utah Court of

opinion

June

an Appeal with

1,

that

1989,

the
was

Order
not

Commission and as such was not appealable

a

of

the

final

Industrial

order

of

(R. vol. II, 6-8).

the
On

December 21, 1989, the Industrial Commission, by Supplemental Order,
re-adopted its original Order of June 1, 1989, thereby affirming the
Administrative Law Judge's Order denying the additional compensation
benefits sought by Plaintiff.
Plaintiff filed this Action on January 19, 1990.

II.
On

December

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
7,

1981,

industrial accident sustaining
1).

Plaintiff

was

involved

in

an

injuries to his cervical spine (R.

He underwent surgery for removal of three disc fragments and

insertion of a bone plug in his cervical spine area on December 21,
1981

(R.

258).

On

June

4,

1982, Plaintiff

underwent

a lumbar

laminectomy at L4-L5 and had bilateral foraminotomies at L3, L4, and
L5-S1

(R.

252).

Plaintiff

filed

a

claim

for

permanent

partial

impairment benefits for his lumbar, as well as cervical spine.
Utah State

Insurance Fund

(now the Workers Compensation

The

Fund of

Utah) denied benefits for the lumbar spine condition, claiming that
there was no causal connection between the industrial accident of

4

December

7, 1981 and

The Plaintiff

the subsequent

June

4. 1982

lumbar

filed an Application for Hearing with the Industrial

Commission of Utah and an evidentiary hearing was held
13, 1982,

(R. 336).

controversy,

a medical

Medical

Panel

the

twelve

and

impairment

rated
one

half

The Panel
was
for

related

panel was

Plaintiff's
percent

further

cervical

(12.5%)

that

industrial

person

at

permanent

all of the cervical

accident

of December

surgery performed June 4, 1982, was not necessitated by the
accident of December 7, 1981.

impairment was assigned

the December

Panel found

7,

lumbar

partial

the Medical

impairment

The

As

industrial

spine,

(R. 352).

spine

whole

concluded

to the

lumbar

appointed

1981.

Plaintiff's

the

on September

At the conclusion of the hearing, due to the

medical

impairment.

surgery.

that the

No permanent

to the lumbar spine as a result of

7, 1981 industrial accident.

Plaintiff

filed written

objections to the Medical Panel Report.

A hearing was held on the

objections to the Medical Panel Report.

The Medical Panel Chairman

was

present,

The Chairman

as was Dr. Lamb,

the Plaintiff's

treating physician.

of the Medical Panel was not persuaded

to change his

mind after listening to Dr. Lamb's testimony.
The Administrative Law Judge on May 2, 1983, adopted

the

findings of the Medical Panel as his own, awarding 12.5% permanent
impairment

for

the

cervical

lumbar area, reasoning

spine

and

that the December

denying

benefits

for

7, 1981 industrial

the

injury

did not result in a rateable impairment to the lumbar spine (R. 14).
The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order issued
by the Administrative Law Judge was not appealed and therefore.
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should be considered res judicata.
On
injury

to

August

his

30,

lumbar

1983, Plaintiff

spine.

Fifty

sustained

dollars

an

industrial

($50.00) in medical

benefits and no temporary total benefits were paid relative to that
industrial accident (R. 38).
On
industrial

July

13,

1984,

the

Plaintiff

injury to his lumbar spine.

sustained

The medical benefits were

paid in the amount of four hundred twenty-five ($425.00).
received

six weeks

($1,860.00)

in

or

one

temporary

thousand

total

another

eight

benefits

hundred

(R.

Plaintiff

sixty dollars

38).

No

permanent

partial disability compensation was paid.
On December

5, 1985, Plaintiff

sustained

an

industrial

injury resulting in an aggravation to his cervical spine.
expenses

were

paid

in

the

amount

forty-six dollars and forty cents
hundred

seven

dollars

of

five

thousand

($5,246.40).

($2,907.00) were

paid

Medical

two hundred

Two thousand nine
in

temporary

total

benefits (R. 38). Again, no permanent partial compensation was paid.
On

April

21,

1988,

Plaintiff

filed

four

separate

Applications for Hearing with the Utah State Industrial Commission
seeking additional permanent partial impairment as well as various
periods of temporary total compensation (R. 32-37).
After an evidentiary hearing held before an administrative
Law Judge on September
help

resolve

Medical

Panel

certain
was

22, 1988, a medical panel was convened to
medical

asked

to

issues.
rate

the

Among

other

percentage

of

things,

Plaintiff's

permanent lumbar impairment attributable to each of the industrial
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the

injuries.

The Medical Panel was also asked to formulate an opinion,

based upon examination of Plaintiff and all of the medical records,
as

to

the

percentage

of

permanent

partial

lumbar

impairment

pre-existing the December 7, 1981, industrial accident (R. 112-270).

Report.

On

November

With

respect

28,

1988,

the

to Plaintiff's

Medical
lumbar

Panel

condition

issued

its

the Medical

Panel found that no permanent partial impairment was attributable to
the August

30, 1983, July 13, 1984 or December

accidents.

The Medical Panel also found that Plaintiff's permanent

partial

lumbar

impairment

pre-existing

the

5, 1985

industrial

December

7,

1981

industrial accident was five percent (5%) whole person (R. 271-283).
On January

11, 1989, the Administrative Law Judge issued

his Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law and Order evaluating all
of

the

evidence

findings

as

his

in

the

own.

record

and

adopting

The Administrative

the Medical

Law Judge

Panel's

reasoned

that

Plaintiff's combined impairments for the December 7, 1981 industrial
injury did
required

not meet
by

Utah

the then existing greater
Code

Annotated,

than 20% threshold,

Section

35-1-69.

The

Administrative Law Judge also found that there was no measurable or
rateable

permanent

impairment

attributable

to

Plaintiff's

lumbar

spine due to the December 7, 1981, August 30, 1983, July 13, 1984 or
December

5,

1985,

industrial

accidents

(R.

290-295).

The

Administrative Law Judge's Order resulting from his Findings of Fact
and

Conclusions

permanent

of Law resulted

impairment

in:

compensation

(1) The denial of any lumbar

because

no

such

impairment

found attributable to any of the claimed industrial injuries; and
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was

(2) The denial pre-existing lumbar benefits claimed as a result of
the December 7, 1981 cervical industrial injury because of failure
to meet the 20% permanent partial impairment threshold required in
order to qualify for pre-existing unrelated impairments.

(The Panel

found only J5% permanent partial impairment pre-existing the December
7, 1981 injury).
The Order set forth above was affirmed by the Industrial
Commission on June 1, 1989, and later as a Final Order on December
21, 1989 by Supplemental Order.
In summary, this Action, filed by Plaintiff on January 19,
1990,
January

attacks
11,

the

1989

Order
as

of

the Administrative

affirmed

on December

Law

21, 1989

Judge

dated

by the full

Commission.

III.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

The issues in this controversy are two-fold:
(1) Whether
Administrative

Law

the

determinations

Judge

and

affirmed

of
by

fact
the

made

by

the

Commission

are

supported by substantial evidence when viewed in the light of the
whole record before the Court?
2)
Commission

Whether
correctly

the

Administrative

interpreted

and

Law

applied

Judge

and

appropriate

the
Utah

Workers* Compensation Law to the facts so determined.

IV.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The basic facts in this controversy are not in dispute and

8

are set forth hereinabove in the Statement of the Case.

V.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I

The

Order

of the Commission,

denying

further

permanent

partial impairment benefits and limiting additional temporary total
benefits was based upon findings of fact which were supported by
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before
the Court.
POINT II
Neither

the Administrative

Law Judge nor the Commission

erroneously interpreted or applied the Law in this controversy.

VI.

ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE ORDER OF THE COMMISSION, DENYING FURTHER PERMANENT
PARTIAL
IMPAIRMENT
BENEFITS
AND LIMITING ADDITIONAL
TEMPORARY TOTAL BENEFITS WAS BASED UPON FINDINGS OF FACT
WHICH WERE SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE WHEN VIEWED
IN LIGHT OF THE WHOLE RECORD BEFORE THE COURT.
Since the proceedings on Plaintifffs claims were commenced
after the effective date of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act
(UAPA), Utah Code Annotated,
Commission's
under

the

decision

standards

Section

properly
set forth

should

63-46b-l

to 22

be reviewed

in that Act.

(1989),

the

by this Court

See Grace Drilling

Company v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 66 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Under Section 63-46b-16 (4)(g), the findings of the Commission will
be affirmed where they are "supported by substantial evidence when

9

viewed

in

Zimmerman

light
v.

of

the

Industrial

whole

record

Commission,

before

122

Utah

the

Court."

See

Adv. Rep. 51 (CA.

11-28-89).
In this case, there is indeed substantial evidence in the
record submitted and viewed as a whole to support the findings of
the Administrative Law Judge and the Commission and to support the
Medical Panel Report which was adopted by the Commission.

A review

of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order of the
Administrative

Law

Judge,

(R.

290-295)

shows

clearly

that

the

Administrative Law Judge carefully examined all of the evidence and
all of the medical
adopting

reports

the Medical

in the record

Panel Report

as

to:

prior

to his decision

(1) the 5% permanent

partial lumbar impairment pre-existing the December 7, 1981 cervical
industrial

permanent

impairment

and

1985

industrial

permanent

impairment

(cervical) resulting from the 1985 industrial accident.

It is true

(lumbar)
accidents

injury,

(2) the

connected
of

the

with

findings

the

Plaintiff,

1983,
and

of

no

1984,
(3)

no

also that the full Commission in dealing with the Motion for Review
filed

by

Plaintiff,

reviewed

the

entire

record

and

mentioned

specifically in its Order Denying Motion for Review that the Medical
Panel had reviewed all the various ratings given over the years,
including the treating physician's rating, and had made a competent
unbiased determination based on its own examination of the applicant
and

on the various

submitted

other

doctor's

opinions

and medical

to the Panel by the Administrative Law Judge.

evidence
The only

evidence proffered by the Plaintiff was the evaluation by Dr. Lamb
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which did not vary significantly from that of the Medical Panel both
with respect to the lumbar impairment pre-existing the December 7,
1981

cervical

attributed

to

Plaintiff.

industrial
the

As

1983

injury
and

indicated

and

1984

before,

the

permanent

industrial
the

impairment

accidents

Administrative

of

Law

the

Judge

reviewed the entire medical record and the testimony and adopted the
evaluations made by the Medical Panel consisting of two experienced,
board

certified

neurologist.
of

the

one

an

orthopedist

and

one

a

The Administrative Law Judge was careful to review all

evidence

treating

specialists,

in

physician

the

record

including

the

evaluation

as well as the Medical Panel Report

of the
and his

finding "that the preponderance of the medical evidence supports the
findings of the Medical Panel" clearly is supported by substantial
medical evidence under either the new or the old review standards.
POINT II
NEITHER THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE NOR THE COMMISSION
ERRONEOUSLY INTERPRETED OR APPLIED THE LAW IN THIS
CONTROVERY.
Having made the appropriate findings with respect to the
lumbar impairment which pre-existed the December 7, 1981 industrial
cervical injury and the absence of any measurable permanent lumbar
impairment

attributable

to

either

the

1983

or

the

1984

lumbar

industrial injuries of Plaintiff, the Administrative Law Judge (and
the Commission) correctly interpreted and applied the applicable law
to those findings.
It is well established Utah Workers' Compensation Law that
the threshold limits established by the Legislature in Section

11

35-1-69. Utah Code Annotated mean exactly what they say.
in

order

for

compensation

benefits

to

be

paid

for

That is.
unrelated

impairments, the industrial injury in questioned must result in at
least 10% permanent partial impairment on an uncombined whole person
basis and that the total impairment of the applicant must be greater
than 20% permanent partial impairment.

This was made clear by the

Utah Supreme Court in the Streator Chevrolet case. 709 P.2d 1176.
1181

(Utah

1985).

further clarified

The

application

of

the threshold

levels was

in Otvos v. Industrial Commission. 751 P.2d 263

(Utah App. 1988). where it was held that an applicant could not
combine two prior injuries in order to reach the necessary threshold
limit to become eligible for payment for unrelated impairments.
this

case.

Plaintiff

does

not

qualify

for

the

payment

of

In
any

pre-existing lumbar impairment because he has failed to meet the 20%
threshold limit for total impairment resulting from the combination
of the industrial cervical injury plus the non-related pre-existing
lumbar

impairment.

Therefore, under the rationale of the Streator

Chevrolet and the Otvos decisions as well as the express language of
the Statute, the Administrative Law Judge properly declined to grant
Plaintiff

compensation

benefits

for

the

unrelated

5%

lumbar

impairment.
With respect to Plaintiff1s contention that there need not
be

any

increase

compensation

in

permanent

for pre-existing

impairment

impairment

in

order

to

obtain

in the same bodily area,

the Administrative Law Judge properly applied the well-established
Utah Law in Workers1 Compensation that there must be some measurable

12

permanent impairment in order to qualify for pre-existing permanent
impairment

even

established
impairment

that

in

an

aggravation

there must,

case.

In

fact,

it

in fact, be a measurable

to qualify as a compensable

is well
permanent

injury for any purposes.

This Court made that clear in the recent decision in Zimmerman v.
Industrial Commission. 122 Utah Adv. Rep. 51, 52, where this Court
affirmed

the Commission

industrial

accident

denial

did

not

Citing Streator Chevrolet.

of permanent
result

in

a

benefits because the
permanent

impairment.

See also Intermountain Health Care Inc..

v. Ortega. Utah 562 P.2d 617. 619 (1977). where the "definite and
measurable" interpretation of the words "substantially greater" was
first set out by the Utah Supreme Court.
In
Commission

summary.
correctly

Compensation

law

to

the

Administrative

interpreted
the

and

findings

Law

Judge

applied

which

were

Utah
made

and

the

Workers'
by

the

Administrative Law Judge in adopting the Medical Panel Report with
respect to the salient medical issues of the case.

In viewing the

record as a whole, it is clear that there was indeed substantial
evidence in the record to support the findings of the Commission
and. as mentioned above, the Commission correctly interpreted and
applied

the

appropriate

Utah Workers1

Compensation

Law to those

findings.

VII.

CONCLUSION

Defendants have established and the record clearly shows
that there is substantial evidence in the record when viewed as a

13

whole

to

support

Administrative
controversy.

the

factual

determinations

Law Judge and affirmed

made

by

by the Commission

the

in this

The record shows also that all the medical evidence,

including the records and reports of Plaintiff's treating physician,
were

reviewed

by

the

Administrative

Law

Judge

as well

as

the

Commission and, further, that all such medical records were provided
to the Medical Panel convened to help resolve the medical issues and
differences.

Finally, the record as a whole shows that the Panel

carefully reviewed
thorough

the complete medical record

examination

of

Plaintiff

before

in addition to its

issuing

its

detailed

analysis which later was adopted by the Administrative Law Judge who
also

reviewed

the medical evidence before making the Findings of

Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order which eventually became the Final
Order

in this Case.

cannot

show

that

Plaintiff has not shown and in our opinion

the

challenged

factual

determinations

supported by substantial evidence in the record.
this

Court's

Standards

of

Review,

those

are not

Therefore, under

factual

determinations

properly must be affirmed.
It is equally apparent that the Commission has properly
interpreted and applied established Utah Workers' Compensation Law
in denying the additional benefits claimed by Plaintiff.

Plaintiff

clearly has not qualified under the threshold impairment statutory
requirements
impairments
Streator

in

order

to

obtain

which are unrelated

Chevrolet

and

the

compensation

to the

Otvos

industrial

Decisions

recognizing and applying the threshold concept.
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for

pre-existing

injuries.

are among

The

the cases

Likewise, the Commission properly recognized and applied
the

measurable

purposes.

permanent

impairment

concept

for

aggravation

That concept also is well established and is found most

recently in the Zimmerman Opinion issued by this Court on November
28, 1989.
Plaintiff
either

the

Commission

factual

has not

sustained

or

legal

in this case.

the

his burden with respect to
determinations

made

by

the

Therefore, the Order of the Commission

properly should be affirmed and Plaintiff's action dismissed.
Respectfully submitted this

, day of Mayt 1990.

Erie V. Boorman, Administrator
Employers1 Reinsurance Fund
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WORKERS' COMPENSATION

35-1-24

History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 17, subd. 2;
C.L. 1917, § 3077, subd. 1; L. 1921, ch. 67,
§ 1; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 42-1-20.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
CJJS. — 100 CJ.S. Workmen's Compensation § 386.

Key Numbers. — Workers' Compensation
*» 1092.

35-1-23. Petition for hearing — Contents.
Such hearing shall be on verified petition filed with the commission, setting
out specifically and in full detail the order upon which a hearing is desired
and every reason why such order is unreasonable or unlawful and every issue
to be considered by the commission on the hearing. The petitioner shall be
deemed to have waived all objection to any irregularities and illegalities in
the order upon which a hearing is sought other than those set forth in the
petition.
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 17, subd. 2;
C.L. 1917, § 3077, subd. 2; L. 1921, ch. 67,
§ 1; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 42-1-21.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
CJ.S. — 100 CJ.S. Workmen's Compensation § 385.

Key Numbers. — Workers' Compensation
*» 1092.

35-1-24. Hearing — Procedure.
Upon receipt of such petition, if the issues presented therein have theretofore been adequately considered, the commission shall determine the same by
confirming, without hearing, its previous determination, or, if necessary to
determine the issue presented, the commission shall order a hearing thereon
and consider and determine the matter at such time as shall be prescribed.
Notice of the time and place of such hearing shall be given to the petitioner
and to such other persons as the commission may find directly interested
therein. If the order complained of is found to be unlawful or unreasonable,
the commission shall substitute therefor such other order as may be lawful
and reasonable.
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 17, subds. 3,4;
CX. 1917, § 3077, subds. 3,4; L. 1921, ch. 67,
5 1; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 42-1-22.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
CJ.S. — 100 CJ.S. Workmen's Compensation § 385.

Key Numbers. — Workers' Compensation
<*» 1092.
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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
(2)(b)(i); added subds. (2)(b)(ii) to (2)(b)(iv);
redesignated former subsec. (3) as subd.
(2)(c)(i); added subds. (2)(c)(ii) and (2)(c)(iii);
redesignated former subsec. (4) as subd.
(2)(d); deleted the last two sentences of
former subsec. (4) which provided that the
employer or insurance carrier would pay benefits to dependents out of the special fund as
provided by former subsecs. (2) and (3), and
to review the issue of dependency at the time
application was made for additional benefits
from the special fund; deleted former subsec.
(5) which provided benefits to dependents at
the rate of 66 % % of the deceased's average
weekly wages at the time of the injury, but
not more than 85% of the state average
weekly wage, with a minimum of $45 per
week out of the special fund beginning with
the time that payments made by the
employer or its insurance carrier terminate
and ending upon the termination of said
dependency; redesignated former subsec. (6)
as subd. (2)(e); increased the maximum
award in subd. (2)(e) from $15,600 to $18,720;
and substituted "second injury fund" for
"special fund" at the end of subd. (2)(e).
Constitutionality.
Provision that death benefits are to be paid
to state fund rather than to estate or family

35-1-69

of decedent where there are no dependents of
the deceased does not deprive such estate,
family or survivors who are not dependents
of the deceased of any constitutional right to
seek redress for wrongful death as guaranteed in Article XVI, section 5, Constitution of
Utah. Star v. Industrial Comm. (1980) 615 P
2d 436.
Dependency and dependent persons.
Mother who was not wholly or partially
dependent on deceased son for financial
assistance to maintain her in her accustomed
station in life was not entitled tc death benefits; her loss of the love, affection, and companionship of her dutiful son uas not compensable under the act Star r. Industrial
Comm. (1980) 615 P 2d 436.
Level of benefits.
In a case of injury arising before the effective date of this section as last amended but
not heard until afterward, the level of benefits to be awarded was determine by the law
in effect at the time of the injuiy, not at the
time of the award. Smith v. Industrial
Comm. (1976) 549 P 2d 448.

35-1-69. Combined injuries resulting in permanent incapacity — Payment
out of second injury fund — Training of employee. (1) If any employee who
has previously incurred a permanent incapacity by accidental injury, disease, or
congenital causes, sustains an industrial injury for which either compensation and
or medical caret or both, is provided by this title that results in permanent incapacity which is substantially greater than he would have incurred if he had not had
the pre-existing incapacity, or which aggravates or is aggravated by_ such preexisting incapacity, compensation a»d t medical care, wnicii mcdic&T care and other
related items are as outlined in section 35-1-81, shall be awarded on the basis of
the combined injuries, but the liability of the employer for such compensation aad
t medical care t and other related items shall be for the industrial injury only and
the remainder shall be paid out of the special second injury fund provided for in
sec Lion oo-x-oo \±) ncrcmai xer rcierrcQ xo «9 tne special xunu. .
For purposes of this section, (a) any aggravation of a pre-existing injury, disease,
2E congenital cause shall be deemed "substantially greater", and compensation,
medical care, and other related items shall be awarded on the basis of ttie combined
injuries as provided above; provided, however, that (b) where there is no such
aggravation, no award for combined injuries shall be made unless the, percentage
of permanent physical impairment attributable to the industrial injuiy is 10% or
greater and the percentage of permanent physical impairment resulting from all
causes and conditions, including the industrial injury, is greater than 20%. Where
the pre-existing incapacity referred to in subsection (1] (b) of this section previously has been compensated for, in whole or in part, as a permanent partial disability under this act or the Utah Occupational Disease Disability Law, such
compensation shall be deducted from the liability assessed to the second injury
fund under this paragraph.
Where the payment of temporary disability benefits, medical expenses, or other
related items are required as a result of the industrial injury subject to this
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section, the employer or its insurance carrier shall be responsible for all such
temporary benefits, medical care, or other related items up to the end of the period
2f temporary total disability resulting from the industrial injury. Any allocation
2 l disability benefits, medical care, or other related items following such period
shall be made between the employer or its insurer and the second injury fund as
provided for herein, and any payments made by the employer or its insurance carrier in excess of its proportionate share shall be recoverable at the time of the
award for combined disabilities if any is made hereunder.
A medical panel having the qualifications of the medical panel set forth in
section 35-2-56, shall review all medical aspects of the case and determine first,
the total permanent physical impairment resulting from all causes and conditions
including the industrial injury; second, the percentage of permanent physical
impairment attributable to the industrial injury; and third, the percentage of permanent physical impairment attributable to the previously existing condition or
conditions r whether due to accidental injury, disease or congenital causes. The
industrial commission shall then assess the liability for permanent partial disability compensation and future medical care to the employer on the basis of the percentage of permanent physical impairment attributable to the industrial injury
only and the remainder any amounts remaining to be paid hereunder shall be payable out of the said special second injury fund L provided, however, that medical
expenses shall be paid in the first instance by_ the employer or its insurance carrier.
Amounts, if any, which have been paid by the employer in excess of the portion
attributable to the said industrial injury shall be reimbursed to the employer out
of saM special the second injury fund upon written request and verification of
amounts so expended.
(2) In addition the commission in its discretion may increase the weekly compensation rates to be paid out of such special fund, such increase to be used for
the rehabilitation and training of any employee coming within the provisions of
this chapter as may be certified to the commission by the rehabilitation department
of the state board of education as being eligible for rehabilitation and training;
provided, however, that in no case shall there be paid out of such special fund for
rehabilitation an amount in excess of $1,000.
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 79; OL. 1917,
§ 3140, subsec. 6; L. 1921, ch. 67, § 1; R.S. 1933
& C. 1943, 42-1-65; L. 1945, ch. 65, § 1; 1955,
ch. 57, § 1; 1957, ch. 62, § 1; 1959, ch. 55, § 1;
1963, ch. 49, § 1; 1965, ch. 68, § 1; 1969, ch. 86,
§ 7; 1973, ch. 67, § 6; 1981, ch. 287, § 4.
No apportionment of insurer's liability.
Where employee suffered aggravation of
back injuries when involved in three separate
accidents while working for two different
employers insured by three different insurance carriers, commission properly required
last carrier to pay compensation for all permanent disability, medical expenses and
temporary disability, in absence of statutory
authority for apportionment. Mountain
States Steel Co. v. Industrial Comm. of Utah
1975) 535 P 2d 1249.
Preexisting contributing condition*
Although the claimant may have had a
preexisting disability, the commission findngs, which are based on reasonable evidence
hat the injury complained of is the sole

cause of the disability for which the award is
made, do not exceed its authority or indicate
a capricious, arbitrary or unreasonable act
Hafer's, Inc. v. Industrial Comm. of Utah
(1974) 526 P 2d 1188.
Where preexisting condition required no
treatment prior to accident, but increased
the resultant disability by one-third,
employer was obligated to pay only twothirds of claimant's medical bills, while the
special fund would pay the remaining third;
the fact that the preexisting condition was
quiescent prior to the injury did not render it
"insubstantial" so as to make the employer
liable for all costs incurred. Intermountain
Health Care, Inc. v. Ortega (1977) 562 P 2d
617.
" Where preexisting condition increased the
disability resulting from an industrial injury,
the employer was obligated only to pay the
portion of expense and disability attributable
to the industrial injury and the special fund
was obligated to pay the portion attributable
to the preexisting condition. Intermountain
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35-1-77. Medical panel — Medical director or medical consultants — Discretionary authority of commission to refer case — Findings and reports — Objections to report — Hearing — Expenses.
(1) (a) Upon the filing of a claim for compensation for injury by accident, or
for death, arising out of or in the course of employment, and if the employer or its insurance carrier denies liability, the commission may refer
the medical aspects of the case to a medical panel appointed by the commission. The panel shall have the qualifications generally applicable to
the medical panel under Section 35-2-56.
(b) As an alternative method of obtaining an impartial medical evaluation of the medical aspects of a controverted case, the commission in its
sole discretion may employ a medical director or medical consultants on a
full-time or part-time basis for the purpose of evaluating the medical
evidence and advising the commission with respect to its ultimate factfinding responsibility. If all parties agree to the use of a medical director
or medical consultants, they shall be allowed to function in the same
manner and under the same procedures as required of a medical panel.
(2) (a) The medical panel, medical director, or medical consultants shall
make such study, take such X-rays, and perform such tests, including
post-mortem examinations if authorized by the commission, as it may
determine to be necessary or desirable.
(b) The medical panel, medical director, or medical consultants shall
make a report in writing to the commission in a form prescribed by the
commission, and also make such additional findings as the commission
may require.
(c) The commission shall promptly distribute full copies of the report to
the applicant, the employer, and its insurance carrier by registered mail
with return receipt requested. Within 15 days after the report is deposited
in the United States post office, the applicant, the employer, or its insurance carrier may file with the commission written objections to the report. If no written objections are filed within that period, the report is
considered admitted in evidence.
(d) The commission may base its finding and decision on the report of
the panel, medical director, or medical consultants, but is not bound by
the report if other substantial conflicting evidence in the case supports a
contrary finding.
(e) If objections to the report are filed, the commission may set the case
for hearing to determine the facts and issues involved. At the hearing,
any party so desiring may request the commission to have the chairman
of the medical panel, the medical director, or the medical consultants
present at the hearing for examination and cross-examination. For good
cause shown, the commission may order other members of the panel, with
or without the chairman or the medical director or medical consultants, to
be present at the hearing for examination and cross-examination.
(f) The written report of the panel, medical director, or medical consultants may be received as an exhibit at the hearing, but may not be considered as evidence in the case except as far as it is sustained by the testimony admitted.
240
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35-1-86, Court of Appeals may review commission's actions.
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review, reverse, or annul any order
of the commission, or to suspend or delay the operation or execution of any
order.
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 87; C.L. 1917,
§ 3148; L. 1921, ch. 67, § 1; R S . 1933 & C.
1943, 42-1-80; L. 1965, ch. 67, § 1; 1987, ch.
161, § 110; 1988, ch. 72, § 6.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment, effective January 1, 1988, deleted the
former first sentence relating to applicability
of the rules of civil procedure, substituted

"Court of Appeals" for "Supreme Court", and
made minor changes in phraseology and punctuation.
The 1988 amendment, effective April 25,
1988, substituted "order" for "award" twice.
Cross-References. — Extraordinary writs,
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 65B.
Supreme Court, jurisdiction, § 78-2-2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Change of theory on appeal.
Conditions precedent to review.
Decisions reviewable.
Standard of review.
Change of theory on appeal.
The rule that parties cannot try a case on
one theory and then attempt to gain a reversal
upon some other theory on appeal, not advanced on the trial, probably should not be applied as strictly to appeals under the Workmen's Compensation Act Stanley v. Industrial
Comm'n, 79 Utah 228, 8 P.2d 770 (1932).
Conditions precedent to review.
Where a claimant accepts compensation suggested by commission and agreed to by insurance carrier, but without formal hearing, there
is no award to review. Johnson v. Industrial
Comm'n, 93 Utah 493, 73 P.2d 1308 (1937).
Decisions reviewable.
Only a final decision of the commission
awarding or denying compensation is subject
to review. Utah Consol. Mining Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 66 Utah 173, 240 P. 440 (1925).
An interlocutory order of the commission

denying employer's motion to dismiss on
ground of res judicata is not reviewable. Utah
Consol. Mining Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 66
Utah 173, 240 P. 440 (1925).
Standard of review.
In reviewing interpretations of general questions of law, appellate court applies a correction-of-error standard, with no deference to the
expertise of the commission. Board of Educ. v.
Olsen, 684 P.2d 49 (Utah 1984).
Administrative determination that individual was an employee for workers' compensation purposes, while entitled to some deference,
was subject to judicial review to assure that it
fell within the limits of reasonableness or rationality; thus, appellate court confined its review to a determination of whether the facts
supported the conclusion of law or whether the
decision was contrary to the evident purpose of
the statute. Board of Educ. v. Olsen, 684 P.2d
49 (Utah 1984).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 100 CJ.S. Workmen's Compensation § 672.

Key Numbers. — Workers' Compensation
» 1825.
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Following the appeal referee's decision,
Grace Drilling filed its appeal and submitted to the Board the written test report
originally requested by the appeal referee.
The Board refused to accept the proffered
report stating that "[t]o consider such evidence would deny the claimant due process
by depriving him of the right to challenge
and rebut the information contained therein." The Board further concluded the appeal referee's decision was a correct application of the Utah Employment Security
Act, supported by competent evidence, and
therefore, affirmed the award of unemployment compensation benefits to Mr. Goodale.

based, is unconstitutional on its face or
as applied;
(b) the agency has acted beyond the
jurisdiction conferred by any statute;
(c) the agency has not decided all of
the issues requiring resolution;
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law;
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making
process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure;
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a decision-making body or were subject to
disqualification;
(g) the agency action is based upon a
determination of fact, made or implied
by the agency, that is not supported by
substantial evidence when viewed in
light of the whole record before the
court;
(h) the agency action is:
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute;
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency;
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior
practice, unless the agency justifies
the inconsistency by giving facts and
reasons that demonstrate a fair and
rational basis for the inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious.

Grace Drilling raises two issues in this
appeal claiming, (1) there is substantial evidence that Mr. Goodale was terminated for
just cause because he tested positive for
drug use while on duty, and (2) the Board
abused its discretion in refusing to consider
the proffered test results.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW UNDER
THE UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURES ACT
These proceedings were commenced after January 1,1988, and thus our review is
governed
by
Utah
Code
Ann.
§ 63-46b-16(4) (1988) of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA").1 Section 63-46b-16(4) governs judicial review of
formal adjudicative proceedings and provides:
The appellate court shall grant relief
only if, on the basis of the agency's
record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially
prejudiced by any of the following:
(a) the agency action, or the statute or
rule on which the agency action is

Grace Drilling claims the Board's findings of fact are not supported by substantial
evidence
as
required
under
§ 63-46b-16(4)(g). No reported Utah case
to date has directly addressed whether the
UAPA modifiesr'the standard for reviewing
the Board's findings of fact previously uti-

1. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-l to -22 (1988
Supp.). Section 63-46b-22(l) provides that the
UAPA applies to "all agency adjudicative proceedings commenced by or before an agency on
or after January 1, 1988
" Additionally,
§ 63-46b-l(l)(b) provides, with our emphasis,
that the UAPA governs judicial review of agency
actions M[e]xcept as set forth in Subsection (2),
and except as otherwise provided by a statute
superseding provisions of [UAPA] by explicit reference to [UAPA/....H The Utah Employment
Security Act has no such superseding provisions

concerning judicial review, and therefore our
review is governed by § 63-46b-16(4). We also
note that the UAPA is substantially similar to
the Uniform Model State Administrative Procedure Act (1981), 14 U.LJL 69 (1988) ("MSAPA").
See Utah A.PJL 1988-89, comments of the Utah
Administrative Law Advisory Committee at 10
(April
25,
1988).
Specifically,
§ 63-46b-16(4)(aHh) "are patterned after the
comparable provisions in the MSAPA (Sections
5-116(c)(1) through 5-116(c)(8))." Utah AJ>uL
1988-89, supra, at 15.
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(g) those matters described in Subsection (3)(a) the appointment Thereafter, the term of office of a
judge of the Court of Appeals is six years and com
through (f)
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in mences on the first Monday m January, next follow,
granting or denying a petition for writ of certiorari m g the date of election A judge whose term expires
for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, b u t may serve, upon request of the Judicial Council, until
the Supreme Court shall review those cases certified a successor is appointed and qualified. The presiding
to it by t h e Court of Appeals under Subsection (3)(b). judge of the Court of Appeals shall receive as addi(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with t h e re- tional compensation $1,000 per annum or fraction
quirements of Chapter 46b, Title 63, m its review of thereof for the period served.
agency adjudicative proceedings
1889
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judgment in panels of three judges. Assignment to panels
78-2-3. Repealed.
1986 shall be by random rotation of all judges of the Court
78-2-4. Supreme Court — Rulemaking, judges of Appeals. The Court of Appeals by rule shall provide for t h e selection of a chair for each panel The
pro tempore, a n d practice of law.
(1) The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of proce- Court of Appeals may not sit en banc.
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a
dure and evidence for use m t h e courts of the state
and shall by rule manage the appellate process. The presiding judge from among the members of the court
Legislature may amend the rules of procedure and by majority vote of all judges. The term of office of the
evidence adopted by t h e Supreme Court upon a vote presiding judge is two years and until a successor is
of two-thirds of all members of both houses of t h e elected. A presiding judge of the Court of Appeals
may serve in that office no more than two successive
Legislature
(2) Except as otherwise provided by the Utah Con- terms. The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for
stitution, the Supreme Court by rule may authorize an acting presiding judge to serve m the absence or
retired justices and judges and judges pro tempore to incapacity of the presiding judge
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the
perform any judicial duties Judges pro tempore shall
be citizens of the United States, U t a h residents, and office of presiding judge by majority vote of all judges
of the Court of Appeals In addition to the duties of a
admitted to practice law in Utah
(3) The Supreme Court shall by rule govern t h e judge of the Court of Appeals, the presiding judge
practice of law, including admission to practice law shall:
(a) administer t h e rotation and scheduling of
and the conduct and discipline of persons admitted to
panels;
the practice of law.
1986
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court,
78-2-5. Repealed.
1988
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the
Court of Appeals; and
78-2-6. Appellate court administrator.
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme
The appellate court administrator shall appoint
Court and the Judicial Council.
clerks and support staff as necessary for the operation
(5) Filing fees for t h e Court of Appeals are the
of the Supreme Court and t h e Court of Appeals. The
1968
duties of the clerks and support staff shall be estab- same as for the Supreme C o u r t
lished by the appellate court administrator, and 78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
powers established by rule of t h e Supreme Court.
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue
1986
all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and pro78-2-7. Repealed.
1986 cess necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders,
and decrees; or
78-2-7.5. Service of sheriff to c o u r t
(b) m aid of its jurisdiction.
The court may a t any time require the attendance
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction,
and services of any sheriff m the state.
1988
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over
78-2-8 to 78-2-14. Repealed.
1986,1988
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from
formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies
or appeals from t h e district court review of inforCHAPTER 2a
mal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, exCOURT OF A P P E A L S
cept the Public Service Commission, State Tax
Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of Oil
Section
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer,
78-2a-l. Creation — Seal.
(b) appeals from the district court review of
78-2a-2. Number of judges — Terms — Functions —
adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political
Filing fees.
subdivisions of the state or other local agencies;
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts,
78-2a-4 Review of actions by Supreme Court.
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except
78-2a-5. Location of Court of Appeals.
those from the small claims department of a circuit court;
78-2a-l. Creation — Seal.
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of
There is created a court known as t h e Court of Aprecord in criminal cases, except those involving *
peals. The Court of Appeals is a court of record and
charge of a first degree or capital felony,
shall have a seal
1986
(f) appeals from district court in criminal
78-2a-2. Number of judges — Terms — Funccases, except those involving a conviction of •
tions — Filing fees.
first degree or capital felony;
(1) The Court of Appeals consists of seven judges.
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for &'
The term of appointment to office as a judge of the
traordmary writs involving a criminal convic
Court of Appeals is until the first general election
tion, except those involving a first degree or cap>*
tal felony,
held more than three years after the effective date of
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